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ABSTRACT 
 
Two remarkable aspects of the Thatcher ‘internal market’ reforms of the NHS were the focus 
on creating a market for hospital services and the way in which primary care was treated 
almost peripherally in the 1989 White Paper (Department of Health 1989a). The 1991 NHS 
reforms introduced general practitioner (GP) fundholding almost as an afterthought, and the 
revision of the GP contract in 1990 Paper (Department of Health 1989b) was conducted 
separately from the implementation of other health care reforms. 
 
In contrast the principal focus of Labour’s  ‘new NHS’ reform is primary care (Department of 
Health 1997).  The intention of the government is both to improve the efficiency and equity 
of primary care provision and to develop Primary Care Groups and Primary Care Trusts 
which both provide care efficiently and act as agents who purchase secondary and tertiary 
care on behalf of patients.  This is an ambitious agenda. 
 
This paper explores the policy context of Primary Care Groups in sections 1 and 2, describes 
and appraises the government proposals in section 3, and identifies major issues involved in 
the implementation of change in section 4. 
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1.  THE SUPPLY OF PRIMARY CARE 
 
The 1911 National Insurance Act created a system of primary care for employees.  Their 
agents were non-profit making Friendly Societies, which collected contributions and paid 
general practitioners on a capitation basis. 
 
Negotiations preceding the introduction of the National Health Service, between the Atlee 
Labour Government and the British Medical Association (BMA), were fierce.  The Labour 
Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, adopted the proposals of the BMA’s Medical Planning 
Commission of 1942, and proposed a mixed remuneration system of basic salary, capitation 
and fees per item of service.  However, he also wished to adopt planning controls to restrict 
entry of new GPs into ‘over doctored’ areas (Timmins 1996).  The BMA resisted such 
controls, arguing that the plans: 
 
would lead to a full time salaried service under either the state or local government.  Doctors 
would be reduced to civil servants, clinical independence and freedom of speech would be 
threatened, and Bevan himself as Minister of Health would have enormous powers to direct 
them. 
 
Thus salaried service was avoided, and GPs had independent contractor (self employed) 
status, with local Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs) replacing the Friendly Societies as 
the ‘bank clerk’ which paid GPs according to agreed financial rules.  FPCs, like their 
predecessors, the Friendly Societies, were price takers, making no attempt to purchase 
primary care efficiently.  De facto, they left the profession to ensure ‘value for money’ in 
health care. 
 
For the first ten years of the NHS, the role of family doctors was ill defined.  Around 40 per 
cent of GPs were single handed, and many had lists of 3000 patients, working from their own 
homes with little or no additional support.  By the end of the 1950s there was a declining 
trend in the number of young doctors electing to work in general practice, and recurrent 
themes of ‘low morale’ and ‘crisis’ in general practice were firmly established by the early 
1960s.  After protracted negotiation between the Ministry of Health and the profession, a 
‘Doctors’ Charter’ was introduced in 1965.  This created a remuneration system combining 
capitation and practice allowances, with additional item of service fees.  It also increased 
funding for premises and practice staffing, encouraging the formation of partnerships and 
establishing a stronger academic base for the specialty of general medicine. 
 
The Doctors’ Charter maintained the independence of general practice and the passive role of 
funding agencies.  The ‘red book’, which set out the terms and conditions of a practitioner, 
declared that a GP ‘should provide those services generally provided in general practice’.  
This circular definition went unnoticed by government, which trusted the doctors to practice 
efficiently and be rigorous ‘gatekeepers’ to the expensive hospital system.  It has since been 
described as the John Wayne contract - ‘a GP’s got to do what a GP’s got to do ...!’ (Dowson 
and Maynard 1985). 
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The system appeared to operate frugally because of the conservative practices of the GPs and 
the modest demands of the population up until the 1970s.  In the 1980s, general medical 
services (GMS) expenditure, in real terms and per capita, began to inflate more rapidly (table 
1).  The growth rates from 1975-76 to 1989-90 were significant.  However, there has been an 
even greater increase in real expenditure in the 1990s, and sharp differences in funding of 
primary care have emerged between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom.  By 1996-
97, annual spending per capita was £57 in England, £156 in Wales, £85 in Scotland and £40 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
Table 1:  Increases in General Medical Services Expenditure per capita, United Kingdom, 1975-1997.  
Index 1974-75 = 100 
 




1975-76  102 104 106 105 103 
1979-80  107 107 108 105 106 
1985-86  147 151 148 149 147 
1989-90  176 176 172 172 172 
1995-96  233 542 288 170 248 
 
Source:  OHE Compendium of Health Statistics, 1997. 
 
This marked growth trend is the product of price and volume effects particularly for 
pharmaceuticals and personnel. 
 
The rate of growth of expenditure on pharmaceuticals over the last 20 years has been 
considerable, with over 12½  per cent of NHS expenditure now devoted to drugs.  This is 
partly due to net ingredient costs (NICs), which have increased by a quarter from 1985-95 
(table 2), again with marked national variations.  Volume has also increased by one third over 
the same period, again with national variations.  The rate of inflation in volume has 
accelerated considerably since 1985. 
 
Table 2: Pharmaceutical volume (prescriptions per capita) and net ingredient cost 
 




  N NIC  N NIC  N NIC  N NIC  N  NIC 
1985  6.8 101  8.8 100  7.1 100  8.5 111 6.9  101 
1990  7.5 112  9.8 110  8.3 110  9.7 125 7.8  112 
























N:  annual average prescriptions per capita   NIC: Net ingredient cost per prescription 
Source:  OHE Compendium of Health Statistics, 1997 
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The other main cause of cost inflation in primary care has been expenditure on staff.   
Between 1985 and 1995 the number of GPs in England grew by over 11 per cent.  However, 
more noticeably, the number of practice nurses and other staff increased even more rapidly, 
by 350 per cent and 117 per cent respectively (table 3).  Thus, the average list size has fallen 
and new staff are available to substitute for GPs in providing care for patients in primary 
care. 
 
Table 3: General Medical Services Staffing 
 
Staff (England)  1985/86  1995/96  Growth rate (%) 
General medical practitioners  24035  36702  11.1 
GP practice staff (whole time equivalent)  27394  59476  117.1 
Practice nurses (whole time equivalent)  2211  9966  350.7 
Average list size  2068  1887  -8.8 
 
The primary care sector has grown rapidly during the last fifteen years, with expenditure of 
£10.5 billion in 1999.  The Thatcher government constrained hospital expenditure vigorously 
in the 1980s but did not focus on efficiency and cost control in the rapidly expanding GMS 
budget (Bloor and Maynard 1993).  The Secretary of State for Health at the time of the 1991 
reforms, Kenneth Clarke, was concerned about the ‘black box’ of primary care.  He sought to 
tackle pharmaceutical expenditure, encouraging generic prescriptions and introducing a 
negative list, and to monitor GP activity more systematically. 
 
The principal obstacle to improved control was the combination of inadequate information 
and little management capacity.  There was no systematic measurement of the volume, 
quality and cost of services provided.  ‘One-off’ studies demonstrated major variations in 
medical practice (e.g. hospital referral rates varied over 20 fold in the late 1980s) and 
evidence of ‘on the job leisure’: a study in Salford identified average patient contact time by 
GPs of only 26 hours per week. 
 
The Thatcher government’s response to such data was not to measure better and evaluate, but 
to impose a new contract on GPs in 1990 (Department of Health 1989b).  This increased the 
average GP’s compensation from capitation funding to around 60 per cent.  The politicians 
believed, in the absence of adequate evidence, that practitioners would be made more 
sensitive to patients’ needs: if they did not provide what patients wanted, the patient might 
move to a different GP, although this rarely happened.  A new system of fees per item of 
service was also introduced.  There were graduated fees, depending on coverage achieved, 
for immunisation, vaccination and cervical cytology, which have been successful in 
achieving increased coverage.  Some of the other fees, for example those for health 
promotion clinics and minor surgery, have been less successful.  Minor surgery fees led to 
increased activity in primary care which did not appear to translate into savings in the 
hospital sector, and health promotion clinics were inadequately defined.  In one case a GP 
had to be reimbursed for showing a Jane Fonda Workout Video in his practice!  The 
divergence in success demonstrates that fee for service payments can be useful only if 
‘success’ is easy to measure and manage. 
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For the rest of the Conservative term of government, political rhetoric was to favour a 
‘primary care led NHS’(NHS Executive 1995).  This was ill defined but could be interpreted 
as primary care being ‘A Good Thing’ although the evidence base for such rhetoric is absent. 
Primary care in the United Kingdom over the last 50 years has been characterised by 
dominance of the general practitioner, and failure to manage resources efficiently and openly.  
During the 20 years preceding the current government, the efficiency of GPs and their staff as 
providers of primary care was little questioned.  Expenditure was demand determined and 
grew rapidly.  Resource allocation formulae did not address the significant inequities in the 
geographical distribution of funding, as these applied only to the hospital sector (Bloor and 
Maynard 1995). In retrospect it is remarkable that primary care not only survived but thrived 
financially during successive Conservative governments. CHE Discussion Paper 168  5
2.  PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS AS PURCHASERS 
   
2.1 General Practice Fundholding 
 
Despite the insulation of the supply of primary care from the 1991 reforms, GPs were 
developed as purchasers of secondary care, taking on the role of fundholders.  General 
practice fundholding was an ‘add-on’ to the 1991 reforms, derived from academic 
discussions in the early 1980s (Marinker 1984, Maynard 1986, Maynard et al 1986).  The 
rationale for fundholding was to increase the awareness of opportunity costs in health care.  It 
was thought that if budgetary responsibilities were combined with clinical responsibilities, 
GPs would contain costs and use resources more efficiently.   
 
Initially general practices with patient lists exceeding 11,000 were allowed to join the 
fundholding scheme. Practices could apply for their own budgets from which to purchase a 
limited list of hospital services, including outpatient services, diagnostic tests and some non-
emergency inpatient and day case treatment.  The budgets also included all the primary care 
services provided by general practitioners.  A minimum list size was specified to reduce the 
risk involved with practice fundholding and a stop-loss arrangement was also included: if the 
annual cost to the practice of hospital treatment for a patient exceeded £5,000, the excess was 
funded by the host district health authority.  Subsequently, the scheme was extended, and 
fundholders ranged from practices with only 3,000 patients (community fundholders) to 
schemes involving multiple practices, such as total purchasing pilots.  Figure 1 outlines some 
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Fig. 1  GP commissioning arrangements 
 
GP fundholders acted both as providers of primary care and purchasers of services on behalf 
of their practice populations.  Despite their secondary importance in the 1989 White Paper 
(Department of Health 1989a), they appear to have been major catalysts for change, shifting 
marginal business between Trust hospitals (Glennerster 1994).  The scheme was introduced 
cumulatively, and by 1996 GP fundholders served over 50 per cent of the population in 
England (Department of Health 1996).  It was introduced with considerable additional 
funding, which both encouraged participation in the scheme, and opposition to it, on the 
grounds of inequity and a ‘two tier service’ (Bevan 1998). The Cornerstone of Labour’s ‘New NHS’  6 
 
The Conservative government claimed great success from the scheme, but the evidence to 
support these claims of success is equivocal.  Fundholding was introduced in the absence of 
formal monitoring and evaluation procedures, and the majority of studies are observational 
and fail to isolate fundholding effects from other concurrent influences.  The published 
evidence focuses on identifying changes in three broad areas: in primary care, in referrals to 
the secondary care sector, and in prescribing. 
 
One of the main benefits that fundholding was supposed to realise was a shift from secondary 
to primary care.  As fundholding embodied incentives to reduce referrals, increased primary 
care activity was expected, as a substitution for secondary care activity.  There was some 
evidence for this.  A comparison of 18 fundholding practices and 81 non-fundholders in 
Lincolnshire, found that fundholders achieved better cervical cytology uptake, child health 
and pre-school surveillance and undertook higher amounts of paid minor surgery (Baines and 
Whynes 1996).  Fundholders also began to diversify their practices by providing new 
services (eg physiotherapy) and developing specialist outreach clinics (Corney 1994). 
 
GPs were better contractors than health authorities as they had better information and more 
motivation to improve service standards and because they could make marginal decisions 
without causing the confrontation that health authorities would face if they changed provider 
(Glennester 1994).  GPFHs also had financial incentives to limit referrals which were not 
strictly necessary so that the practice could save money and to encourage patients with 
private insurance to accept private treatment, the cost of which did not fall on the practice 
budget. The extent to which these incentives influenced practice remains unclear (Dixon and 
Glennerster 1995).  In a small study of ten first wave fundholding practices and six non-
fundholding practices in the Oxford region, which were matched according to various 
practice characteristics, Coulter and Bradlow (1993) found no evidence that hospital referrals 
were influenced by budget holding.  In contrast, a study of fundholding practices in Scotland 
revealed a significant reduction in referral rates, matched by an increase in the use of direct 
access services (Howie et al 1995).  In another study (Surender et al 1995) it was found, that 
3 years into the scheme, NHS referral rates by GPFHs had actually increased slightly, and 
that, contrary to expectations, referrals to private clinics had generally fallen.  There was no 
evidence of a substitution away from specialist care. 
 
Critics of the scheme have argued that fundholding embodies incentives to have patients 
admitted through casualty rather than via referral, because fundholders do not have to pay for 
emergency care, but evidence that this happened is weak.  In an analysis of more than 50,000 
episodes in the South West Region, no indication was found that fundholding had an impact 
on the proportion of emergency admissions to hospital (Toth et al 1997). Baines and Whynes 
(1996) found referrals were contrary to the hypothesis: their comparison of 99 practices in 
Lincolnshire showed fundholders had a lower ratio of emergency to elective admissions.  The 
authors suggest this may have been because GPFHs were more successful in placing elective 
contracts than health authorities. CHE Discussion Paper 168  7
The impact of fundholding on prescribing has received more attention in the literature than 
any other single aspect of GPFH activity.  Early studies suggested that GPFHs were more 
successful than non-fundholders at containing drug costs (Bradlow and Coulter 1993, 
Maxwell et al 1993, Wilson et al 1995), but longer term analyses are less clear (Glennerster 
et al 1994, Harris and Scrivener 1996).  Over the period since the introduction of fundholding 
there has been a general and pronounced rise in overall prescribing costs, irrespective of the 
fundholding status of practices.  Evidence about whether the rate of inflation has been lower 
for GPFHs than other practices remains a subject of debate.   
 
The most comprehensive study of prescribing costs, featured all general practices in England 
for the six years from April 1990 to March 1996 (Harris and Scrivener, 1996).  This analysis 
demonstrated that prescribing costs had increased by up to 59% in fundholding practices and 
by 66% for non-fundholders over the period.  For each fundholding wave, a small relative 
reduction in prescribing costs was observed in the year prior to fundholding.  Maximum 
reductions occurred in the first year but tailed off to the extent that increases in costs were 
similar to that for non-fundholders beyond the third year of fundholding status.  Fundholding 
was associated with cost escalation of 6% less than that of non-fundholding over the five year 
period of its existence.  This is not a particularly substantial return on the significantly more 
generous investment received by fundholding practices.  This was the conclusion reached in 
an Audit Commission report: fundholders made relatively modest changes to patient benefits 
and management capacity, and may not have provided sufficient improvements to justify 
their higher cost (Audit Commission 1996). 
 
Limited though these benefits were, questions have been raised about whether they could be 
attributed to fundholding at all.  Fundholding was a voluntary scheme and it may be that 
those practices which participated would have been successful anyway.  In an examination of 
the possibility of selection bias, Baines and Whynes (1996) concluded that ‘practices 
obtaining fundholding status in the early waves were those most capable of achieving success 
as officially assessed’.  Consequently, caution should be exercised in attributing changes in 
activity to the fundholding status of the practices.  Moreover, innovations were not exclusive 
to fundholding practices: practices were reviewing prescribing protocols and investing in new 
facilities long before fundholding was introduced (Corney 1994). 
 
Fundholding also generated vociferous opposition, most particularly because it was perceived 
to be inequitable.  This inequity took two forms (Bevan 1998).  First, patients registered with 
fundholders appeared to enjoy preferential access to secondary care compared to those 
registered with non-fundholders in the same health authority (Dowling 1997, Beecham 1997, 
Audit Commission 1996).  Second, per capita funding available for fundholder patients was 
more generous than that for patients funded directly from health authority budgets (Dixon 
1994, Dixon et al 1994, National Audit Office 1995). 
 
In summary, it seems that fundholding was inequitable and had failed to generate benefits of 
significant enough magnitude to justify the expense of the scheme.  The experiment was 
poorly evaluated and had not run its course.  Various alternatives were being adopted toward 
the end of the Conservative government’s final term in office.  The most innovative of these 
was total purchasing.  
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2.1.  Total purchasing 
 
The NHS Executive introduced the total purchasing pilot (TPP) initiative in 1994, following 
local developments in GP fundholding (NHS Executive 1995).  Standard fundholders took 
responsibility for purchasing a much wider range of services, such as maternity services and 
inpatient mental health (Mays and Mulligan 1998).  Unlike standard fundholding and other 
aspects of the 1991 reforms, the total purchasing pilots were constructed as experiments, and 
evaluated in a three-year ‘before and after’ study.  Total purchasing pilots were implemented 
with minimal central guidance, leading to considerable variation among them (TP-NET 
1997). Mays and Mulligan (1998) refer to the TPPs as ‘selective purchasers’ because most 
were not, in fact, ‘total’ purchasers: many gave responsibility back to their health authority 
for the purchase of some services, such as accident and emergency and forensic psychiatry. 
 
There were 53 first wave TPPs, which went ‘live’ in April 1996.  A year later, they were 
joined by 35 second wave TPPs. 37% of TPPs comprised single practices, the median 
population covered was 23,000 patients and approximately 5% of patients in England and 
Wales were covered by TPP (Mays et al 1998).  
 
Direct management costs of running TPPs over and above fundholding varied from £10,000 
to £99,000 for single practice projects and from £1,000 to £339,000 for multi-practice 
projects, reflecting diversity in scale, scope, ambition and managerial infrastructure (Posnett 
et al 1998).  Overall, it was expected that rolling out total purchasing more generally would 
have led to a net increase in the management costs of primary care commissioning (Killoran 
et al 1998).  The highest performing TPPs, in terms of their reported achievements, had 
considerably higher management costs than the lowest performing projects.  They also 
appeared to have more GP involvement, contributing to these direct management costs (Place 
et al 1999). 
 
Evidence relating to total purchasing has been summarised by Mays and Mulligan (1998) 
 
•  TPPs varied greatly in size, management arrangements, budget arrangements and 
reported achievements.   
•  Total purchasing is more ambitious and more costly to run than standard fundholding.   
•  There was limited evidence on whether TPPs have achieved service efficiency objectives, 
but projects have altered the use of acute services in terms of admissions and bed days, 
reporting achievement of around half their self-defined objectives. 
•  Total purchasing probably had greater scope for promoting equity than standard 
fundholding, depending on budget negotiations with the Health Authority. 
•  Little was known about the quality of services delivered under total purchasing, and most 
TPPs did not formally assess their patients’ needs or systematically use research evidence 
to inform their service provision. 
•  There was limited accountability other than ensuring financial accountability, and TPPs 
did not give high priority to informing or involving patients in purchasing decisions. 
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3.  PRIMARY CARE IN THE ‘NEW NHS’ 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
While acknowledging that it was not without benefit, New Labour’s White Paper formally 
announced the demise of fundholding: 
 
Despite its limitations, many innovative GPs and their fund managers have used the 
fundholding scheme to sharpen the responsiveness of some hospital services and to extend the 
range of services available in their own surgeries.  But the fundholding scheme has also 
proved bureaucratic and costly.  It has allowed development to take place in a fragmented 
way, outside a coherent strategic plan.  It has artificially separated responsibility for 
emergency and planned care, and given advantage to some patients at the expense of others. 
(Department of Health 1997 s5.5) 
 
The rhetoric of New Labour is that GP fundholding has failed.  This voluntary and partial 
system was replaced in April 1999 with a comprehensive and compulsory system of Primary 
Care Groups (PCGs) many of which, in time, are expected to evolve into Primary Care 
Trusts, which will be freestanding organisations.  
 
PCGs were introduced in the White Paper ‘The new NHS: modern, dependable’ (Department 
of Health 1997), with similar concepts presented in consultation documents for Scotland 
(Scottish Office 1998), Wales (Welsh Office 1998) and Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland 
Office 1998).  Plans for primary care outside England are less developed, due to devolution 
of power to the constituent parts of the United Kingdom.  Legislation to change the 
organisation of primary care will be undertaken by the legislative assemblies in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  The policy was described as ‘going with the grain’, aiming to 
‘keep what has worked about fundholding, but discard what has not’.  PCGs have been 
established across the country, ‘bringing together GPs and community nurses in each area to 
work together to improve the health of local people’ (Department of Health 1997). 
 
3.2.  Primary care in England: Primary Care Groups 
 
The functions of primary care groups are described in the White Paper (Department of Health 
1997), and developed in later guidance (HSC 1998a-e). 
 
The government intends that PCGs will: 
   
•  commission health services for their populations from NHS Trusts, within the framework 
of the Health Authority’s Health Improvement Programme (HImP), ensuring quality and 
efficiency; 
•  monitor performance against the service agreements they (or, initially, the Health 
Authority) have with NHS Trusts; 
•  develop primary care, by joint working across practices, sharing skills, providing a forum 
for professional development, audit and peer review, assuring quality and developing the 
new approach to clinical governance, and influencing deployment of resources for 
general practice locally.  Local Medical Committees (LMCs) will have a key role in 
supporting this process; The Cornerstone of Labour’s ‘New NHS’  10 
•  better integrate primary and community health services and work more closely with 
social services on both planning and delivery; 
•  contribute to the HImP, helping to ensure that it reflects the perspective of the local 
community and experience of patients; 
•  promote the health of the local population, working in partnership with other agencies. 
 
Performance criteria for these functions have not been articulated.  The form of PCGs is 
intended to be flexible and to reflect local circumstances, building on existing arrangements 
such as total purchasing, locality commissioning groups and multifunds.  There will be four 
optional and progressive forms of involvement, and PCGs are expected to progress so that in 
























The Government has legislated to introduce freestanding level III and IV Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs).  PCTs may include community health services previously provided by existing NHS 
Trusts, and community NHS Trusts may merge with PCTs to integrate service and 
management support.  Ultimately, PCTs will be able to run community hospitals and other 
services but will not take responsibility for mental health or learning disability services, 
although links with these services will be developed. 
 
A core set of requirements applies to all levels of PCG/Ts.  They are to be accountable to the 
Health Authority (HA) and required to: 
 
•  be representative of all GP practices in the PCG; 
•  have a Governing Body which includes community nursing and social services as well as 
GPs drawn from the area; 
I  Supporting the Health Authority in 
commissioning care for its population, acting 
in an advisory capacity. 
II  Taking devolved responsibility for 
managing the budget for health care in their 
area, formally as part of the Health Authority. 
III  Become established as freestanding 
bodies accountable to the Health Authority for 
commissioning care. 
IV  Become established as freestanding 
bodies accountable to the Health Authority for 
commissioning care and with added 
responsibility for the commissioning of 
community health services for their 
population CHE Discussion Paper 168  11
•  take account of social services as well as HA boundaries, to help promote integration in 
service planning and provision; 
•  abide by the local HImP; 
•  have clear arrangements for public involvement including lay representation on the 
Governing Body and open meetings; 
•  have efficient and effective arrangements for management and financial accountability. 
 
Each PCG has a Governing Body, consisting of between 4 and 7 GPs, 1-2 nurses, a local 
social services authority representative, a Health Authority representative, a lay member and 
the PCG Chief Executive.  This will be quorate only when there are a majority of GPs present 
and GPs will have first refusal on the chair (Milburn 1998).  This policy permits continued 
medical dominance of primary care, which sits uneasily with the move towards 
multidisciplinary primary health care teams. 
 
PCGs were intended to develop around natural communities and existing local groups, taking 
account of the boundaries with social services and typically serving around 100,000 patients, 
with the largest serving more than twice this number. It is unclear how this recommended 
figure was determined as it exceeds the optimum size to minimise management costs or to 
spread risk (Place et al 1999, Bachmann and Bevan 1996). It may be that by covering large 
‘natural’ communities perceptions of a ‘two-tier’ service and rationing by postcode will be 
less in evidence.  
 
Beyond level I, PCGs will be funded with a unified cash limited budget and will have the 
opportunity to ‘deploy resources and savings to strengthen local services and ensure that 
patterns of care best reflect their patients’ needs’ (HSC 1998b).  This budget covers hospital 
and community health services, prescribing and GMS infrastructure.  For the first time this 
effectively cash limits the overall prescribing budgets, as overspends on prescribing will 
mean reduced expenditure on other services to stay within the overall budget.  Up to now, 
prescribing budgets have been ‘demand-determined’, without an overall limit.  Indicative 
budgets will be used for individual practices, but the PCG will have to develop mechanisms 
for ensuring that these budgets are not overspent.  Practice level incentive arrangements are 
encouraged to promote best use of resources.  Such incentives will require careful 
specification and monitoring.  The inclusion of the practice infrastructure component of 
general medical services (GMS) in the budget has been of particular concern to GPs, but 
subsequent policy indicates that expenditure on staff, premises and computers will be subject 
to a minimum guaranteed floor (Milburn 1998). 
 
Management costs for PCGs will be combined with that for the Health Authority, with a limit 
of £3 per head estimated for management costs initially, increasing as PCGs take on more 
responsibilities or merge with community trusts.  Analysis of the transactions costs of TPP 
suggests that PCGs may have difficulties living within this envelope, particularly if 
contributing parties (GPs, nurses and other professionals) are to be adequately reimbursed for 
their (management) time devoted to the PCG (Killoran et al 1998; Place et al 1999).  Over 
time as PCGs move to higher levels, the balance of monies between the PCG and HA may 
change, although this will require a scaling down of HA duties, perhaps facilitated by further 
HA mergers.  It is also possible that PCGs will start to share functions without full merger  
(Smith et al 1999). The Cornerstone of Labour’s ‘New NHS’  12 
Health Improvement Programmes of Health Authorities determine much of the work of a 
PCG.  PCGs should influence the development of HImPs and will be accountable for their 
implementation.  Preparation of documents such as Primary Care Investment Plans and 
Organisational Development Plans will also be required from PCGs. PCGs will specify and 
maintain service agreements with NHS Trusts about the quality and level of care provided in 
hospitals.  
 
Accountability is maintained through an Accounting Officer to the Health Authority.  HAs 
will monitor and advise PCGs, offering additional direction if an individual PCG falls behind 
its peers, and has the power, in extremes, to withdraw or reduce responsibilities, or change 
leadership and management.  As well as financial accountability through an Accounting 
Officer, a senior professional within the PCG will be nominated to be responsible for clinical 
governance and quality of clinical care.  Individual practices will also be encouraged to 
identify a leader for clinical governance.  To achieve Trust status, PCGs must demonstrate 
that they have a systematic approach to monitoring and developing clinical standards in 
practice.  The Primary Care Investment Plan and annual Accountability Agreements, 
containing key targets, objectives and standards, will be required by the Health Authority. 
 
These plans are ambitious and novel.  The surviving dominance of GPs, much of it ceded by 
ministers in negotiation in 1998, makes them liable for the successes and failures of PCGs.  
The novelty of these reforms lies in seeking to manage (control) primary care, to reduce 
practice variation and enhance quality, openly and efficiently.  Previously GP practices, 
particularly when acting as providers rather than purchasers, have been independent ‘islands’ 
in the uncharted waters of primary care.  This era of no accountability is clearly at an end: 
price taking is being translated into price making. 
 
3.3.  The current situation 
 
481 primary care groups were introduced in England in April 1999.  These are all constituted 
as committees of their local Health Authority with the Chairs (usually GPs) accountable to 
the Chief Executive of the Health Authority. From 1 April 2000, 50-60 PCGs in England will 
be selected to move to Trust status.  The requirements for this move are not yet known and 
will be determined by future guidance. 
 
The heterogeneity of PCGs is considerable.  Some are based on existing arrangements, such 
as GP multifunds or total purchasers, and may find ‘promotion’ to Trust status 
straightforward.  Others are fragmented in terms of their previous status and the development 
of internal management and external collaboration.  Such organisations have limited 
management capacity and lack the information systems required for the efficient 
development of practices within PCGs and appropriate collaboration across groups. 
 
It is unlikely that the existing stock of PCGs will survive many years.  As Trust status 
spreads, amalgamation seems likely, and Chief Executives and other staff currently being 
recruited may be reorganised and even made redundant in such mergers. 
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4.  FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
An underlying motivation for the introduction of PCGs is the belief that patients will benefit 
by further extending the role of primary care so that more (and, supposedly, better) decisions 
are made by those who are the first port of call for most users of the NHS.  Moreover, by 
obliging all GPs to adopt one or other option, the two tier system associated with fundholding 
will be less in evidence.  Also, because PCGs have responsibility for more than simply a 
practice list they may be able to plan more strategically for their local population than 
fundholding allowed, particularly as they will be expected to commission in accordance with 
their local HImP.  But, in making primary care the cornerstone of their health care reforms, 
the current Labour government faces challenges.  Four particular challenges relate to 
organisation structure, clinical governance and maintenance of quality, financial 
accountability and rationing. 
 
4.2.  Organisational size and structure 
 
PCGs are to be larger organisations than most preceding models of primary care 
commissioning in the NHS.  It may be that this will make them better able to manage risk 
but, apparently, larger groupings are not required for this.  A simulation exercise exploring 
the budgetary implications of rare costly referrals suggested that a risk pool of 30,000 may be 
adequate (Bachmann and Bevan 1996).  Moreover, risks may be more manageable over the 
longer time frames that Health Service Agreements, rather than contracts, allow. 
 
PCGs may be able to realise economies of scale from amalgamating practices.  As GPs 
commission for a wider range of services for a larger population the fixed costs associated 
with needs assessment, writing the purchasing plan and contracting can be spread among 
more patients.  This suggests that costs will fall as PCGs grow in size.  However, at some 
point such economies will be exhausted.  Evidence from analysis of Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs) in the USA, which have been likened in certain respects to PCGs 
(Ham et al 1998), does not provide a clear answer.  Given (1996) suggests that returns are 
exhausted at 115,000 enrollees, while Wholey et al (1996) argue that economies are realised 
at only 50,000 enrollees.  The continuing amalgamation of managed care companies on the 
basis of asserted economies of scale casts some doubt on these figures. 
 
One crucial difference between HMOs and PCGs (at least in the short term) is the contractual 
status of their medical staff.  The staff of HMOs are typically salaried employees while GPs 
are likely to remain as independent contractors.  While it is relatively straightforward to 
achieve harmony among GPs and to get them to accept budgetary responsibility when 
managing a single practice’s fundholding budget, the administrative burden associated with 
coordinating GPs from the practices comprising the PCG may compromise any economies 
derived from creating larger commissioning groups.  Analysis of the transactions costs 
associated with Total Purchasing suggests a substantial amount of management time is spent 
on co-ordinating GPs and communicating organisational objectives.  Furthermore this cost 
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problems, PCGs may adopt a range of organisational structures which allow them to balance 
strategic against day-to-day management (Street and Place 1998, Smith et al 1999). 
 
Reform is likely to bring with it the gradual alteration of the GP contract of employment.  In 
1997 the Conservative government, with Labour support, passed legislation to facilitate pilots 
of salary paid GPs.  In late 1998 the then Minister of Health, Alan Milburn, indicated that it 
was the government’s intention to reform doctors’ contracts.  Such reform has always been 
expensive (Klein and Maynard 1998) and this time is unlikely to be different.  The creation 
of a new salaried system of GPs would require shift working, skill substitution and careful 
management of the new contract with performance criteria to ensure activity and quality. 
 
4.3.  Quality and clinical governance 
 
The recent NHS reforms promise profound changes in the government of general practice.  
With acceptance by the General Medical Council and the Royal College of General 
Practitioners of the need for re-accreditation of all practitioners every five years, quality 
guidelines will be central to the professional development of medical and other staff.  The 
reforms also place a statutory duty of maintaining quality of clinical care on the Chief 
Executives of hospital, community and primary care Trusts.  At present they have only a 
financial responsibility under the law (to break even and make a 6 per cent return on historic 
capital investment).  The creation of this new duty of ‘quality’ introduces a new agenda in 
risk management, clinical audit and quality assurance for all managers. 
 
The initial definition of clinical governance was vague (Department of Health 1998): 
 
a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving 
the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an 
environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish. 
 
However, since then it has become clear that quality relates not just to clinical effectiveness 
but to cost effectiveness.  The discussion document about the role of the National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) (Department of Health 1999) makes it clear that companies 
wishing to have their products accepted for reimbursement by the NHS must demonstrate 
cost effectiveness if they are to be incorporated into NICE guidelines. 
 
General practitioners will receive these NICE guidelines, which will have varying levels of 
application depending on the robustness of the data.  One of the earliest guidelines is likely to 
be for the use of beta interferon in the treatment of multiple sclerosis.  This is an area where 
medical practice variation is considerable and ‘postcode’ rationing is much criticised. 
 
A guideline like this will be issued with a degree of obligation to GPs: they will be expected 
to adhere to the guideline or face management interference.  An interesting issue, given the 
independent contractor status of GPs, is to consider how implementation of NICE guidelines 
will be monitored, and what are the implications if a GP refuses to adhere to the guidelines.  
Such behaviour will incur the displeasure of a PCG or PCT Chief Executive, who has a duty 
of quality related to NICE guidelines.  Also it will attract the attention of the Commission on 
Health Improvement (CHI).  This organisation will audit Trusts thoroughly every three to CHE Discussion Paper 168  15
four years and will respond to high profile incidents where quality is in question.  The 
pressures for GPs to conform will be considerable. 
 
However, with the focus of NICE being predominantly on pharmaceuticals, at least initially, 
the need for improved management information will be acute.  An obvious source of 
pharmaceutical prescribing information is the Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (PPA).  At 
present all dispensing chemists send their prescription forms to PPA, who reimburse 
pharmacists and collate information.  This information role could be developed by 
augmenting prescriptions with a diagnostic code and a patient identifier.  This would create 
an invaluable data set for epidemiologists and managers.  NICE practice guidelines will 
target interventions at particular patient groups and an augmented PPA information system 
could be used to measure speed and the extent of adherence to guidelines by practitioners.  
There will be economies from a national system and such data will be an invaluable source 
for research. 
 
The costs of introducing clinical governance have not been estimated.  At present plans are 
vague and evolving, but the resource consequences of professional, Trust, NICE, CHI and 
PPA investments will be considerable.  There is a risk that parsimony and poor management 
may lead to the fragmentation and failure of some elements of this long overdue process of 
regulating the quality of primary care. 
 
4.4. Financial  accountability 
 
In general, attempts to increase GP involvement in commissioning have been rationalised 
either as a means to improve patient access and service delivery through the inclusion of a 
primary care perspective in the commissioning process or to make GPs directly accountable 
for the resource consequences of clinical decisions.  The former aim may be achieved by 
introducing PCGs as advisory bodies only (ie PCG I), but clearly the government envisages a 
more substantial role. 
 
Experience suggests that in order to make GPs financially accountable they must be actively 
engaged in the management of a budget.  In many of the multi-practice sites forming TPPs, 
GPs were content to delegate financial responsibility to the lead GP and the TP management 
team, but this reduced the extent to which GPs faced direct incentives to alter their own 
practice.  Unless peer pressure is strong, the aim of engaging all GPs within a local group 
will probably require notional budgets set at practice level (even if budgets are aggregated for 
management purposes) and it requires significant investment in co-ordinating the views and 
actions of GPs. 
 
In order to make GPs financially responsible they must be sufficiently motivated to work 
with their colleagues in the PCG towards developing and realising common organisational 
objectives.  All GPs are obliged to participate in a PCG of one form or another.  However, the 
incentive for these independent (and generally individualistic) contractors to cooperate with 
one another and accept interference in their decision making is not obvious (Butler and 
Roland 1998). 
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For those who were not opposed to fundholding on ideological grounds, there were clear 
incentives to taking on fundholding status, as it promised GPs greater leverage and autonomy 
about where, when and how their patients were treated and the prospect of generating savings 
to plough back into the practice.  As much larger conglomerations it will be interesting to see 
how individual GPs, particularly fundholders and non-fundholders, grouped in the same PCG 
reconcile their differences and come to a shared vision about the overall objectives of the 
PCG.  Compared to practice based fundholding it is likely to prove more difficult to reach 
consensus and to ensure that all GPs consider the wider interests of the PCG when making 
clinical decisions which have financial implications.  We should not be surprised if some GPs 
resist any attempt to make them participate in a scheme which has the prospect to reduce 
their own autonomy. 
 
Nevertheless if PCGs are to be financially accountable and manage within their budgets, they 
will have to develop mechanisms for monitoring and perhaps limiting GP referral and 
prescribing behaviour.  This is a major challenge and requires a balance of rewards and 
penalties. Health authorities have found it difficult to manage activity and their global 
budgets, in part because they are a step removed from the GPs who make many of the 
decisions which determine the pattern of service provision.  It is hoped that PCGs will be in a 
better position to operate within a global budget by virtue of involving GPs in the 
management structure. 
 
However, with a comprehensive budget set at PCG level, GPs will face restrictions on their 
referral and prescribing behaviour in order to meet the constraints of this global budget, 
despite the government having given assurances that restrictions will not be imposed: 
 
Patients will continue to be guaranteed the drugs, investigations and the treatments 
they need.  If a primary care group overspends, the overspend will be managed 
within the funds made available to health authorities generally and to the NHS more 
widely, much as health authority overspends are handled now.  There is no question 
of anyone being denied the drugs they need because a GP runs out of cash.  GPs’ 
participation within a PCG, or membership of a PCG board will not affect their 
ability to fulfil their terms of service obligation always to prescribe and refer in the 
best interests of their patients.  I can guarantee that the freedom to refer and 
prescribe remains unchanged. (Milburn 1998). 
 
One of the central concerns of the White Paper and subsequent documents is the variability in 
access to and use of services throughout the country (Department of Health 1997; 1998).  
This is being addressed at all levels of the NHS, with the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence providing overall guidance about effective and cost-effective practices, Health 
Authorities being monitored according to their performance in reducing variations, and 
Trusts and PCGs introducing clinical governance mechanisms. 
 
Clearly, referral and prescribing variations will have to be managed by PCGs to ensure 
greater efficiency and to remain in budget.  Alignment of clinical and financial accountability 
and the desire to reduce treatment variations is incompatible with political assurances that the 
freedom to refer and prescribe remains unchanged.  The get-out clause from the 
Department’s perspective is that the Milburn letter states that ‘patients will continue to be 
guaranteed the drugs, investigations and the treatments they need’ [emphasis added].   CHE Discussion Paper 168  17
Responses to patient needs must be cost-effective: the freedom to refer and prescribe remains 
so long as it is justifiable. 
 
GPs appear to be under no illusion that limits are to be placed on their clinical freedom and 
that the ‘best interests of patients’ should be defined as the overall interests of the broader 
population for which the PCG is responsible, rather than merely the patient in the consulting 
room.  Among the challenges facing those working in PCGs is their ability to manage a 
global budget and, in particular, what mechanisms they should employ to prevent over-
spending. 
 
The Department of Health, after 50 years of pressure from the Treasury, is attempting to cash 
limit the GMS budget.  However, it is realising only partial success.  The non-GP part of the 
budget is to be cash limited and allocated by weighted capitation formula similar to that used 
in the hospital sector.  The reluctance to tackle the issue of the gross inequities in the 
distribution of GPs (e.g. many more per capita, even with need weighting, in the South West 
than the North East) is related to the power of the medical profession to resist change and 
influence policy makers. 
 
4.5.  Rationing 
 
A paradox of the NHS debate is that the government denies the existence of rationing but, 
like its predecessor, it reforms the structures of the NHS to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation (rationing).  The allocative goal of the NHS is to use resources efficiently so that 
potential population health gains are maximised from its limited budget.  The pursuit of this 
goal requires the practice of economics based medicine.  However, whilst governments 
vigorously espouse the cause of ‘value for money’, they are reluctant to confront the 
rationing issue explicitly and fully. The logical consequence of Milburn’s statement and the 
constitution of NICE is that resource allocation will be informed, if not determined, by cost-
effectiveness criteria. 
 
The Labour government also expresses concerns about equity.  The Acheson report on 
inequalities in health (Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health 1999) described 
familiar findings about the growth of inequality, but failed to cost and prioritise its 
recommendations.  This leaves a lack of clarity about the equity goals of the government, 
their ranking in relation to other goals, and the preferred nature of trade offs.  
 
What principles of rationing might be implied from the behaviour of politicians and the 
electorate?  Williams (1996) suggests the following three criteria, which may form a basis for 
debate and consensus formation: 
 
1. Equals should be treated equally and with due dignity, especially when near to death. 
2. People’s needs for health care should be met as efficiently as possible (imposing the least 
sacrifice on others). 
3. Inequalities in the lifetime health of the population should be minimised. 
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At present, government policy, through the creation of clinical governance, NICE and CHI, is 
focusing its rationing efforts on efficiency (2 above).  This is incomplete.  Health care 
professionals may at times practice inefficiently because of social objectives, such as the high 
valuation of new born children, which may require resources not to be used cost effectively.  
This implies a strong equity objective (i.e. 3 above).  The policy question is therefore how 
much efficiency (health gain) is society prepared to sacrifice to pursue equity goals?   
Ignoring such issues makes medical practice difficult and undermines the acceptability of 
evidence based practice guidelines to be produced by NICE. CHE Discussion Paper 168  19
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The historical failure to manage primary care provision in an efficient and open manner has 
been condoned, as politicians continued to advocate a ‘primary care led NHS’ and developed 
the capacity of primary care to purchase secondary care services.  The paradoxes implicit in 
these policies are as significant as the variations in primary care practice and the relative 
absence of management systems. 
 
The government’s reform of primary care is of great importance to the sector itself and to the 
NHS as a whole.  In the last decade there has been a failure to ensure openness and 
accountability in primary care performance, as reform energy has previously been directed at 
the hospital system.  This failure means that the task of primary care reform is more difficult.  
For example, GPs are now having to respond to activities such as audit which were imposed 
in the hospital sector around a decade ago.  The government have an ambitious agenda which 
is yet to be determined fully and which will be costly.  As ever this will raise hopes and 
antagonism.  Aneurin Bevan’s view was that ‘the only way to get a message across to a 
doctor is to write it on a cheque’.  Primary care reforms in the next decade may well require 
increased expenditure, but will also require clearly articulated objectives, shrewd 
management and careful performance assessment. 
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